The recent resignation of UK defence minister John Healey, along with his colleague Al Carns, has sent shockwaves through British politics and dealt a significant blow to the already fragile leadership of Keir Starmer. This move was not a mere accident but a calculated signal from Healey, indicating his ambition and political savvy. It's a strategic play, showcasing his potential as a future leader or a key cabinet member under a new prime minister.
However, the implications of this move extend far beyond British politics. It has inadvertently highlighted the fragile nature of the Aukus nuclear submarine proposal, a trilateral agreement between Australia, the UK, and the US. By leaving Australian ministers Richard Marles and Penny Wong waiting in London, Healey has once again exposed the political stunt behind Aukus.
Aukus, conceived in secrecy and launched with great fanfare by former Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison, was a hurried attempt to align the divergent political objectives of three distant nations. For Australia, it was a desperate attempt to seek security through the embrace of powerful allies, a pathological insecurity born out of occupying a vast and distant continent. For the UK, it was an opportunity to regain some strategic credibility post-Brexit and to parade its imagined role as a global player with European influence. And for the US, it was a cynical move to maintain strategic dominance and keep its allies dependent, a strategy that easily survived the Trump administration.
The political fragility of Aukus is evident when domestic political power is at stake. The agreement is easily cast aside in the face of hard realities, as demonstrated by the UK's focus on retaining power against Nigel Farage's Reform UK party. The lofty ideals of shared values and an international rules-based order are quickly forgotten when faced with domestic challenges.
From its inception, Aukus has lacked a solid policy foundation to support its political ambitions. It's a classic case of the "emperor's clothes" syndrome, where a single event can expose the flimsiness of the entire enterprise. Five years on, we are still waiting for the fundamental policy principles to justify Australia's acquisition of nuclear-propelled submarines. The basic questions remain unanswered: Why? What are the options? How? At what cost? Are there alternatives? What are the downstream effects?
Australia has a long history of political initiatives lacking robust policy support, and Aukus is yet another example of this trend. The US under secretary of war for policy, Elbridge Colby, has expressed serious doubts about the policy viability of Aukus submarines. The Congressional Research Service shares these concerns, noting the US naval construction industry's inability to meet its own demands, let alone provide for the Royal Australian Navy.
Healey's resignation has, in a way, done a service by once again exposing the true nature of Aukus - a grand political theatre with little substance. As the saying goes, once the political purpose is gone, the show must end. And so it seems the curtain is slowly falling on the Aukus agreement, leaving us to question the wisdom of such politically motivated ventures and their long-term implications.
